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Abstract
In a circular city model, I consider network design and pricing decisions for a
single fast transport connection that faces competition from a slower but better
accessible transport mode. To access the fast transport network individuals have
to make complementary trips by slow mode. This fact has interesting implications
on the location decisions. I show that in the presence of competition the profit-
maximizing and socially optimal decision would be to cluster the two stations. By
contrast, in the absence of competition both a profit-maximizing firm and a social
planner would locate the two stations on opposite sides of the circle.
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1 Introduction
In many countries privatization and deregulation of transport industries raises a lot of
opposition. One of the greatest fears is that a privatized transport firm would change
its network structure, that is, the location of their stations and the connections between
cities, such that some cities would be deprived of a good connection to other cities. Indeed
the events after the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 have shown that this
is not unlikely. Since 1978 almost all airline carriers have transformed their U.S. networks
into hub-and-spoke networks. As a result, most airline passengers can not reach their
destination directly. Moreover, the hub-and-spoke network structure has raised concerns
on market dominance at hub airports1.
Although the emergence of hub-and-spoke networks has been analyzed extensively,
the airline literature typically ignores the presence of competing transport modes. This
approach is reasonable in the case of the U.S. airline industry, as the distance between
cities in the U.S. is large and the railway industry in the U.S. does not offer a feasible
alternative to airline travel. However, in Europe and Japan the situation is different due
to the availability of a network of high-speed train connections. Furthermore, competition
from other transport modes is even more important in other transport industries. For
example, railway transport has always faced fierce competition from transport by car,
since the speed of a train and a car is comparable. In urban areas, underground transport
faces competition from bus and tram services. One should note that these competing
transport networks differ in speed and accessibility. Typically the faster transport mode
is less accessible than the slower transport mode.
With the current wave of deregulation in other transport industries than the airline
industry, it is necessary to understand network design decisions in case a transport net-
1A hub-and-spoke network is a network in which one airport, the hub, has direct connections to
all other airports, while all other airports, the spoke airports, are only connected to the hub airport.
Hendricks, Piccione & Tan (1995) show that under economies of density either the empty network, the
hub-and-spoke network or the point-to-point network is optimal. Hendricks, Piccione & Tan (1997) show
that a hub-and-spoke network may prevent entry into a hub-to-spoke market. Borenstein (1989) shows
that route and airport dominance enable carriers to raise prices.
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work operator faces competition from other transport services. In this paper I therefore
introduce a model in which I consider the station locations and the price a network oper-
ator would charge, when individuals also have the alternative to travel through a slower
but better accessible competing transport network.
The model is simple but reasonable, and it provides interesting results and intuition
for the role of competing transport networks in network design. Individuals live and work
at random locations on a circular city and they need to travel between their home and
work. Each combination of home location and work place, therefore, constitutes a trip,
having an origin and a destination. An individual can make a trip by a slow transport
mode around the circle, either clockwise or counterclockwise. Alternatively he or she can
use the fast transport system to cross the circle. It is crucial that slow mode transport
is necessary to access the fast transport network. Hence, a trip by fast mode consists of
three complementary journeys; a trip by slow mode from home to the departure station,
a trip by fast mode from station to station, and finally a trip by slow mode from the
terminating station to the work place. In this model I first derive demand for the fast
transport connection. For that purpose I derive the size of the market area for the fast
connection, which I define as the set of trips for which a fast transport connection is
preferred. This definition differs from the usual interpretation of a market area as being
a region around a station.
Next, I derive the main result of the paper. I consider location and pricing decision in
case the fast transport connection is operated by a profit-maximizing firm. Contrary to
intuition, I show that the stations of the fast connection are not located on opposite sides
of the circle but somewhat closer. Hence, the monopolist typically clusters the stations.
This tendency of clustering becomes stronger if competition from the slow transport mode
is stronger. In an extreme case, when there is little difference between the velocity of a fast
connection and a slow connection, the distance between the two stations is only one sixth
of the circle (Figure 1). On the other hand, in the absence of competition the stations are
located symmetrically on the circle. I also consider the socially optimal locations of the
two stations. Again, the stations are not located on opposite sides of the circle. However
3
station 1
station 2
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Figure 1: A fast transport network in the circular city where the distance between the
stations is 1/6 of the circle.
the distance between the socially optimal locations is larger than the distance between the
monopolist’s optimal locations, since a social planner is also concerned about the benefit
from a trip. The intuition behind these results is that competition is more severe for trips
whose origin and destination is between the two stations, than for trips whose origin and
destination is in the hinterland of the two stations. In case the stations are located on
opposite sides of the circle, there is no hinterland and competition creeps in from both
sides of the circle. Hence, the firm has an incentive to cluster the stations such that it
obtains an area where competition is absent.
Literature that considers location decisions of transport networks is sparse. The model
in this paper is indeed the first model that introduces competition between transport
networks of different speed and density to analyze the impact on location decisions. There
is some related literature. Braid (1989) uses the linear city model to find the optimal
locations of bridges across a river, where individuals live on one side of the river and
work on the other side. Also, Crampton (2000) uses the linear city model to compute
optimal urban-rail station spacing. However, in these two papers it is assumed that
transportation across a bridge or by train occurs instantaneously without any costs, while
in my paper individuals still face transportation costs and a fare that are increasing in
distance when they use a fast transportation connection. This difference is crucial in
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the analysis of the design of the transport network. There is also some literature that
consider the market areas that competing transport firms serve, when the transportation
costs between transport modes differ (Hyson & Hyson 1950, Nie´rat 1997). However, in
this literature the network structure is given, while in this paper decisions on the network
design are the primary focus of the analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I lay out the model and I derive
the demand function for the fast transport connection. In Section 3 I assume that the
fast transport network is operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and I derive the optimal
fare and station locations for the firm. Next, in Section 4, I assume that a social planner
chooses the location of the two stations and the optimal fare. Finally, in Section 5 I
conclude.
2 The model
In this section I describe the transportation model. Infinitesimal individuals are uniformly
distributed with density 1 on a circle C of unit circumference. All individuals travel to one
random destination that is also uniformly distributed on the circle. This destination is
independent of the location of the individuals. Together, the set of individual’s locations
and the set of destinations form the set of trips T = C × C.
To make a trip, an individual can choose between two transport modes, a ’slow’ trans-
port mode or a ’fast’ transport mode. I assume that the slow mode is offered competitively
at price 0, and that all individuals can access the slow mode network directly from their
location. Furthermore, I assume that the time costs are linear in distance, and that every
trip yields a value u to the individual. Hence an individual on a trip (x, y) ∈ T obtains
a utility of
US(x, y) = u− g |y − x| ,
if he chooses the slow mode. Here g > 0 is the marginal time cost of travelling by slow
mode, and the distance |y − x| is the shortest arc length between x and y. Note that the
longest distance a traveller could make is a trip where the destination is opposite to the
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starting point. Hence, the utility of a trip is bounded from below by US(x,
1
2
) = u− g/2.
I assume that u is high enough to persuade all individuals to travel, that is, u ≥ g/2.
On the other hand, an individual might choose the fast mode for her trip. I assume that
the fast mode network consists of only one (two-way) connection between two stations,
located at z1 and z2 on the circle. Hence, only individuals on a trip (z1, z2) (or (z2, z1)
in the opposite direction) can access their destination directly through the fast mode
network. All other individuals have to travel by slow mode first to and then from the
stations to complete a trip. I therefore assume that the utility of a trip (x, y) ∈ T to an
individual x travelling to y by fast mode is
UF (x, y; d, p) = u− fd− p− g |zi − x| − g |y − zj| ,
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j are chosen such that |zi − x| + |y − zj| is minimal. Here
d ≡ |z2 − z1| is the distance between the two stations, f is the marginal time cost of
travelling on the fast mode connection, 0 < f < g, and p ≥ 0 is the fare (price) of the
fast connection.
In Figure 2 I illustrate the transportation costs of the two travel mode options for a
trip from x to y, where the upper and lower half of the figure only differ in the destination
y. The solid arrow in the two pictures illustrates a trip from x to y by slow mode. The
transportation cost of such a trip is g |y − x|. On the other hand, the three dotted arrows
illustrate a trip from x to y by fast mode, which consists of three different journeys with
a total cost of g |z1 − x|+ fd+ p+ g |y − z2|. Note that for the trip (x, y) in the bottom
picture an individual incurs a cost for a journey from z2 to y both for the fast mode option
as for the slow mode option.
2.1 Demand
I now derive the demand for fast mode transport when prices and station locations are
given. The procedure is similar to that in spatial models. However, derivation of the
market area is more complicated, because the utility an individual obtains depends both
on the location of the individual as on its destination. Hence, for each home location
6
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a) the destination is between the stations
b) the destination is behind the stations
Figure 2: Transportation costs in two competing transport networks.
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there is a different region of workplaces for which the fast mode is preferred. Moreover,
it turns out that the market area is not lying symmetrically around a station. I therefore
introduce the following notation. I define a location x to be between the stations if x lies
on the shortest arc length between z1 and z2, such that |z2 − x| + |x− z1| = d. On the
other hand, a location x is behind the stations if x lies on the longest arc length between
z1 and z2, such that |z2 − x| + |x− z1| = 1 − d. Note that if z1 and z2 are on opposite
sides of the circle x is both between and behind the stations.
First I assume that an individual on a trip (x, y) ∈ T prefers the fast mode if and only
if
UF (x, y; d, p) ≥ US(x, y).
or equivalently
|y − x| − |zi − x| − |y − zj| ≥ fd+ p
g
. (1)
for i, j such that |zi − x| + |y − zj| is minimal. It follows that an individual will only
choose the fast transport mode if the fast transport connection offers a ’shortcut’ to
transportation by slow mode, that is, travelling from home to station i and then from
station j to the workplace involves a shorter distance than travelling directly from home
to work. Note that it immediately follows that the distance of the trip |y − x| can not be
too small. Hence, there are always trips where travel by slow mode is preferred.
Let me now consider the market area for the fast mode, which is the set of trips
TF ⊂ T where the fast mode connection is preferred to the slow mode network. This
area can be split into four parts. First I consider the trips (x, y) ∈ TF , where both x
and y are located between the stations (Figure 2a). Because the stations are chosen such
that |zi − x| + |y − zj| is minimal, it must hold that |zi − x| + |y − x| + |y − zj| = d.
Substituting into (1) and rewriting, it becomes clear that the fast mode is preferred as
long as
|zi − x|+ |y − zj| ≤ 1
2g
(gd− fd− p). (2)
It immediately follows that both |zi − x| ≤ (gd−fd−p)/2g and |y − zj| ≤ (gd−fd−p)/2g.
In the second case, suppose that x is between the stations but the destination y is
behind the stations (Figure 2b). Since the distance |y − x| is the length of the shortest
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path between x and y, it holds that
|y − x| = min{ |y − zi|+ |zi − x| , |y − zj|+ |zj − x| }.
Substituting into (1) the decision criterium becomes
|y − zi| − |y − zj| ≥ fd+ p
g
and (3)
|x− zj| − |x− zi| ≥ fd+ p
g
. (4)
Because x is between the stations, and y is behind, (3) and (4) can be rewritten as
|y − zj| ≤ 1
2
− d+ 1
2g
(gd− fd− p),
and
|x− zi| ≤ 1
2g
(gd− fd− p). (5)
Given some starting point between the stations, x, cases 1 and 2 define a range of desti-
nations for which the fast mode is preferred. This range is drawn in Figure 3a. The size
of the range is
1/2− d+ 2xˆ− |zi − x| ,
where
xˆ ≡ xˆ(p, d) ≡ 1
2g
(gd− fd− p). (6)
Consider now the third case, where x is behind but y is between the stations. This
case is equivalent to the second case, except that starting and destination points are
interchanged. Hence, in this case, (x, y) ∈ TF if and only if
|x− zi| ≤ 1
2
− d+ xˆ, (7)
and
|y − zj| ≤ xˆ. (8)
The fourth and last case considers a trip (x, y) where both x and y are behind the
stations. In this case
|y − x| = min{ 1− d− |y − zj| − |zi − x| , d+ |y − zj|+ |zi − x| }. (9)
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a) x is between the stations
b) x is behind the stations
Figure 3: Range of destination for which the fast mode is preferred, given some starting
point, x.
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Substituting (9) into (1) and rewriting, the condition for (x, y) ∈ TF becomes
|zi − x|+ |y − zj| ≤ 1
2
− d+ xˆ, (10)
and
xˆ ≥ 0. (11)
Cases 3 and 4 also constitute a range of destinations for which the fast mode is preferred
whenever the starting point x is behind the stations. This range is shown in Figure 3b.
Again, the size of this range is 1/2− d+ 2xˆ− |zi − x|.
Now that I have found the market area, I can derive the demand function. The
following proposition states the demand function.
Proposition 1 Consider the transportation model of Section 2. If the distance between
the stations is d, and the fare of a fast mode connection is p with p ≤ gd − fd, then
demand is given by
D(p, d) = 6xˆ2 + 6xˆ(1/2− d) + (1/2− d)2,
where
xˆ ≡ xˆ(p, d) ≡ 1
2g
(gd− fd− p).
If p > gd− fd, then D(p, d) = 0.
Proof: Consider a trip (x, y) ∈ TF , and suppose that p ≤ gd− fd, such that xˆ ≥ 0. From
(2) and (5) it follows that if x is between the stations then |zi − x| ≤ xˆ. On the other
hand, if x is behind the stations, equations (7) and (10) imply that |zi − x| ≤ 1/2−d+ xˆ.
Moreover, for a trip originating at x the size of the range of destinations y, such that
(x, y) ∈ TF , is
1/2− d+ 2xˆ(p; d)− |zi − x| ,
where xˆ ≡ xˆ(p; d) is given in (6). Hence, because there are two stations, demand is given
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D
p
gd-fd
O 3(g/2-fd)2/2g2-(1/2-d)2/2(1/2-d)2
Figure 4: Demand function in the transport model.
by
D(p, d) = 2
∫ xˆ
0
1/2− d+ 2xˆ− x dx
+2
∫ xˆ+1/2−d
0
1/2− d+ 2xˆ− x dx
= 6xˆ2 + 6xˆ(1/2− d) + (1/2− d)2.
Furthermore, if p > gd− fd, then xˆ < 0, and one of the conditions (2), (5), (8) or (11) is
violated. Hence, if p > gd− fd, then the set TF is empty. Q.E.D.
Figure 4 shows a typical demand function. The demand function is a quadratic func-
tion in p and d, and for all feasible prices 0 ≤ p ≤ gd − fd the demand function is
downward sloping and convex in p. Hence, the demand function has a familiar shape,
except that there is an upperbound for p. If p = gd− fd, then
D(gd− fd, d) = (1/2− d)2,
while demand collapses to zero if p becomes larger than gd− fd.
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3 Profit maximizing location and pricing
In this section I consider the optimal price and location in case the fast mode network is
operated by a monopolist. To focus on the demand side I assume that a firm operating
the connection incurs no costs.
I derive the optimal price and location for the monopolist operator. The monopolist
maximizes profits
pi(p, d) =
{
pD(p, d) if 0 ≤ p ≤ gd− fd
0 otherwise.
Since the fast mode’s comparative advantage is greater the larger is d, one would expect
that the optimal location of the two stations for the monopolist would be such that the
stations are located on the opposite site of the circle, such that d = 1/2. However, the
following proposition shows that this is not true.
Proposition 2 Consider the distance dM between the two stations and price pM that
maximize monopoly profits. The optimal price is
pM =
g − f
6
and the optimal distance is dM = 1/6 for f < g ≤ 3f , and
dM =
g2 − f 2 − 2gf
2g2 − 6f 2
for g ≥ 3f .
The proof follows from standard constrained optimization and is given in the Appendix.
Note that dM is continuous in g, even at g = 3f , and that dM → 1/2 whenever g →∞.
Why do the stations not lie on opposite sides of the circle? The answer is hidden in the
nature of competition in this transport model. Competition between the two transport
modes is more severe for trips starting and ending between the two stations. In this
case the length of the trip |y − x| is typically smaller than the distance between the two
stations (Figure 2a). For these trips, the slow mode becomes an attractive alternative if
the price of the fast mode increases or if the start or destination of the trip is located
further away from the stations.
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However, the fast mode network virtually does not face any competition for trips
between the station’s hinterlands, which are the locations behind the two stations. The
reason is simple. Suppose that for a trip to station 2, (x, z2) the fast mode is optimal.
If the destination of a trip (x, y) is further away from x than station 2 (Figure 2b), an
additional travel distance has to be covered. However, this additional travel distance
is in both cases made by slow mode transport and therefore the additional travel costs
does not depend on the choice of transport mode. Hence, if fast mode transport has a
comparative advantage for a trip to station 2, it also has a comparative advantage for
all trips to the hinterland of station 2. Clearly the size of the hinterland weighs heavily
on the monopolist’s demand. This can also be seen from Figure 3. Demand from the
hinterland is however bounded, as it becomes attractive to use the slow mode network in
the opposite direction, if the destination is located far away in the hinterland.
It now becomes clear why demand is not maximal when the stations are located on
opposite sides of the circle. In this case the stations lack a big hinterland, as the fast
mode network faces competition from the slow mode network from both sides of the
circle. Only if the stations are located closer, the fast mode network is able to create
and serve a hinterland, where competition from the slow mode network is less severe.
Following this reasoning, one might think that it is optimal to minimize the distance of
the stations. However, if the distance becomes smaller, the reservation price for a trip
from station to station, gd − fd, decreases. At some point, a smaller distance between
the two stations has to be combined with lower prices, which has a negative impact on
profits, and as a result the optimal distance is bounded from below.
Note that the above result depends on the competitiveness of the transport modes. As
g increases or if f decreases the slow mode becomes less competitive, and therefore there
is less reason for the fast network operator to take competition from slow mode transport
into account. Therefore, if g → ∞ or if f → 0, then the distance between the stations
goes to a half.
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4 Social welfare
Since the optimal station locations from a monopolist’s view are quite surprising, one
wonders if results differ when the firm is operated by a social planner. Therefore, I turn
to the question what price a social planner would set, and what station locations he would
choose. I assume that a social planner maximizes the social welfare function
W (p; d) = pi(p; d) + CS(p; d),
where CS(p; d) is aggregate consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus has a simple structure. Consider first CSS, the consumer surplus
in case all travellers choose the slow mode, that is if p > gd− fd. Then
CSS = 2
∫ 1/2
0
u− gx dx = u− 1
4
g.
If p < gd − fd, such that some travellers choose the fast mode, the consumer surplus
must be higher than CSS. This extra surplus that travellers obtain from using the fast
mode network is given by the usual consumer surplus triangle under the demand function
D(p; d). That is
CS(p, d) = CSS +
∫ gd−fd
p
D(s; d) ds
and one can apply the usual social welfare analysis in a partial equilibrium model. Hence,
at the social optimum, price equals marginal cost, that is pS = 0, and social welfare is
given by
W (0; d) = 0 + CSS +
∫ gd−fd
0
6{xˆ(p, d)}2 + 6xˆ(p, d)(1/2− d) + (1/2− d)2 dp
= CSS + 2g
∫ (gd−fd)/2g
0
6x2 + 6x(1/2− d) + (1/2− d)2 dx
= u− g/4 + 2gx0
(
2x20 + 3x0(1/2− d) + (1/2− d)2
)
,
where x0 = (gd− fd)/2g.
I now turn to the socially optimal distance between the stations, dS. The first order
derivative of the welfare function is given by
∂W (0; d)
∂d
= −6fx20 + (2g − 6f)x0(1/2− d) + (g − f)(1/2− d)2.
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Note that if d = 0, then ∂W/∂d = (g−f)/4 > 0, and if d = 1/2, then ∂W/∂d = −6fx20 <
0. Since the welfare function is a cubic function in d, the optimal distance dS must be
between 0 and 1/2. Solving ∂W/∂d = 0 after some manipulations, it turns out that the
only optimal solution is
dS =
g
g + 3f +
√
g2 + 3f 2
.
It is easy to check that dS > 1/6 for g > f . Furthermore
dS >
g
2g + 3f
>
g2 − f 2 − 2gf
2g2 − 6f 2 = d
M .
Hence, I have the following proposition
Proposition 3 For all g > f , the distance between the two stations that maximizes social
welfare, dS, and the distance between the stations that maximizes firm’s profits, dM , are
such that
dM < dS < 1/2.
So a social planner would not locate the stations on opposite sides of the circle either.
This is in line with the monopolist’s decision. However, from the point of view of the
social planner, the monopolist separates the stations too little. The reason is as follows.
A social planner is not only concerned about the level of demand for the fast connection,
but also about the utility individuals obtain. This utility depends on the reduction in
transport costs due to availability of a fast transport connection. The individual that
benefits the most from the fast mode connection is an individual making a trip from
station to station, (zi, zj), in which case the cost reduction is
UF (z1, z2; d, 0)− US(z1, z2) = gd− fd.
Hence, the greater the distance between the stations, the higher is this maximum cost
reduction, and this effect pushes the socially optimal distance, dS, away from the monop-
olist’s optimal distance, dM .
That the socially optimal distance between the stations is still smaller than a half is
not directly obvious given that the maximum cost reduction is increasing in d. The reason
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of this result lies in the fact that more individuals obtain the maximum cost reduction if
d gets smaller. In fact all individuals making a trip from the hinterland of station i to
the hinterland of station j obtain the maximal cost reduction of gd − fd, as long as the
stations are between the origin and destination of the trip. That is, if (x, y) is such that
|y − x| = |zi − x|+ d+ |y − zj| then
UF (x, y; d, 0)− US(x, y) = gd− fd.
The reason is already explained in the monopoly case. If the fast mode has a comparative
advantage on a trip from station to station, it also has the same comparative advantage
on a trip from the hinterland of a station to the hinterland of the other station since
travelling behind a station is always made by slow mode. Hence the cost of travelling
behind a station adds up to the transportation costs whatever transport mode is chosen.
If d = 1/2 then the stations lack a big hinterland. In fact, if d = 1/2, then the maximum
cost reduction in only obtained for a trip from station to station, and consequently the
cost reduction effect becomes second order. Hence, social welfare is not optimal if d = 1/2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that a simple transportation model with competing transport
modes can give interesting insights into the optimal network design of a transport network.
Competition from a slower, but more accessible transport network incites a monopolist
transport operator not to locate the stations on opposite sides of the circle, as the size of
the hinterland increases if the stations are located closer to each other. This incentive to
diminish the distance between stations is also present for a social planner; however, it is
stronger for a monopolist than for a social planner. On the other hand, if the difference
in speed between the slow and the fast mode is very large, competition is not an issue
and the fast mode operator locates its stations near opposite sides of the circle.
Of course, the model I have presented uses strong assumptions and future research
should try to generalize and extend this restricted model to analyze a broader range of
issues in transport economics. To my opinion, the most interesting extension would be to
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solve the transportation model for n stations and endogenize the number of stations and
connections. Such an extension could be used to analyze the impact of new technologies
on the density and the structure of transportation networks. To see the relevance of such
issues, consider the history of railway industries. In the beginning of the 20th century
railway transport was by far the most efficient transport method for longer distances.
However, in course of the 20th century it has lost its comparative advantage to airplane
and car. This has resulted in a reduction of stations and connections in the railway
network. Nowadays, the railway industry is coming back with the introduction of high-
speed trains, reviving the competition between airline and railroad travel. It is not clear
what the implications on airline networks are. A model of competing transport networks
with an endogenous number of stations could shed more light on this issue.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: For the moment, allow d = 0 in the feasible set F , such that
F = {(p, d) ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ d ≤ 1/2; 0 ≤ p ≤ gd− fd }.
Then the monopolist solves the optimization problem
maxp≥0,d≥0 pD(p, d)
s.t. p ≤ (g − f)d
and d ≤ 1/2.
(12)
Note that the feasible set F is closed and bounded with linear restrictions, and that the
profit function pD(p, d) is continuously differentiable at p and d. Hence, for any value of
f and g, 0 < f < g, a maximum exists and the optimal solution satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
first order conditions.
It is easy to check that d > 0 and p > 0. Hence the first order conditions are given by
p
∂D(p; d)
∂p
+D(p; d)− λ = 0, (13)
p
∂D(p; d)
∂d
+ λ(g − f)− µ = 0, (14)
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p ≤ (g − f)d and λ(gd− fd− p) = 0, (15)
d ≤ 1/2 and µ(1/2− d) = 0, (16)
for some λ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0. Remember that xˆ ≡ xˆ(p; d) ≡ 1
2g
(gd − fd − p). Conditions
(13) and (14) can be rewritten as
λ = 18xˆ2+
1
g
(18g− 6f)xˆ(1/2− d) + 1
g
(4g− 3f)(1/2− d)2− 3g − f
2g
(2xˆ+1/2− d), (17)
and
µ = λ(g − f) + p
g
{ (g − 3f)(1/2− d)− 6fxˆ }. (18)
Now suppose that both λ = 0 and µ = 0. Then by (18)
xˆ =
g − 3f
6f
(1/2− d). (19)
It is immediately clear that if g < 3f condition (15) is violated. Substituting (19) into
(17) and solving, one obtains
d =
g2 − f 2 − 2gf
2g2 − 6f 2 or d = 1/2.
After some manipulations it follows from (19) that if d = g
2−f2−2gf
2g2−6f2 , then p = (g − f)/6,
and if d = 1/2, then p = (g − f)/2. These are two solution candidates in case g ≥ 3f ,
λ = 0 and µ = 0.
Now suppose that λ > 0, but µ = 0. Then p = gd− fd by condition (15) and xˆ = 0.
By equations (17) and (18)
λ = (1/2− d)2 − 3dg − f
g
(1/2− d) = 2d(1/2− d)− 3dg − f
g
(1/2− d).
Solving for d, one gets d = 1/2 or d = 1/6. If d = 1/2, then λ = 0, a contradiction, and
if d = 1/6 then p = (g − f)/6. Note that for d = 1/6, λ > 0 if and only if g < 3f .
Now suppose that µ > 0, but λ = 0. Then d = 1/2 and by (18)
µ = −6f
g
pxˆ(p, 1/2) ≤ 0.
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This is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that µ > 0 and λ > 0. Then d = 1/2 and p = (g − f)/2. However,
substituting these values into (17) one gets λ = 0, again a contradiction.
Summarizing, if g < 3f , then the only solution candidate is d = 1/6 and p = (g−f)/6.
If g ≤ 3f there are two candidates, d = 1/2 and d = g2−f2−2gf
2g2−6f2 . However, for d = 1/2
and p = (g − f)/2, profits are zero, while for d = g2−f2−2gf
2g2−6f2 and p = (g − f)/6 profits are
strictly positive. Hence, d = 1/2 and p = (g − f)/2 can not be a maximum.
For each value of g we now have a single remaining candidate that satisfies the first
order conditions. Since a solution exists, this candidate must be the maximum. That is,
if g < 3f , then dM = 1/6 and pM = (g − f)/6. If g ≤ 3f , then dM = g2−f2−2gf
2g2−6f2 , and
pM = (g − f)/6. Note that if g = 3f , then dM = 1/6. Q.E.D.
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